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Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to explain the policy stasis around private 
security regulation in Africa. Africa is one of the largest theatres of private military 
and security company operations in the world. Yet, there is still no new regional 
convention or policy on their regulation. Previous studies focused on Western 
efforts to formulate regulatory instruments as well as the role of private military 
and security company activities in Iraq and Afghanistan and previous controversies 
of Executive Outcomes. This article examines factors that inhibit the continent 
from moving on from the Organisation of Africa Unity Mercenary Convention of 
1977. It broadly argues that the regulatory policy stasis is primarily a question of 
agency and preferences. The African Union and its member states have pursued 
two forms of ‘agency slack’—shirking and slippage—in order to favour a legally 
binding international convention through the United Nations. This position is the 
sum of historical and incumbent experiences at a regional and international level, 
most of which are outside the control of regional institutions. Thus, the African 
Union and its member states have used shirking tactics to minimize participation in 
non-United Nations initiatives. They also used slippage tactics to justify exemption 
from such initiatives while stating their understanding of private military and 
security companies. These two tactics summarily shield African regional 
preferences in a world where the region has relatively lower power in international 
politics.  
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In Africa, the activities of private military and security companies (PMSC) 
have grown into an intricate transnational network of various actors since the 
famed cases of Executive Outcomes (EO) activities in Angola and Sierra Leone.1 
PMSCs operate in different countries serving different clients: from guarding 
corporate installations in the Democratic Republic of Congo to providing services 
to the United Nations (UN) in Somalia. They also provide services to international 
military organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
the United States Africa Command (US AFRICOM) in Sudan, Somalia and West 
Africa. All the aforementioned are the major international security partners of the 
African Union (AU); yet, the AU does not directly contract PMSCs for any of its 
missions. It is bound by policy and empirical factors that are peculiar to the 
continent.  
The existing literature is yet to provide an explanation of why the African 
continent still has to promulgate a policy on PMSCs. A recent article reviewing the 
scope and limitations of the study of PMSCs, omitted the fact that the literature 
does not explain why the AU has not produced a new convention since the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention on Mercenarism of 1977.2 The 
fact that Africa is the largest theatre of PMSC operation next to Iraq and 
Afghanistan,3 and is still without a regulatory framework deserves explanation. 
Furthermore, the PMSC-sending regions and states, such as the European Union 
(EU) and the United States (US), are working on regulatory frameworks while the 
receiving continent seems less spirited about similar initiatives. A discussion of 
PMSC policy is necessary in light of increased African agency in international 
affairs.  
African agency and positionality are important given that the continent is 
intricately woven into the fabric of international security. Generally speaking, 
African scholars see a Western imperialistic global security order as encroaching 
on African interests.4 In the early 1990s, Buzan predicted that African security, 
alongside the entire global South, would constitute the periphery of a Western-
centred global security order.5 Furthermore, African security arguably exists under 
the shadow of an “American imperium”.6 However, Africa and other developing 
regions have increased their role and agency in international affairs over the years. 
African agency has been of interest as well. As Zondi argues, collective positions 
are an indication of agency in international affairs.7 Since the transition from the 
OAU to the AU, there have been efforts to gain control of a number of continental 
issues or, more importantly, to have a stake in any process that occurs on African 
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territory. Given Africa’s rise in international politics, it is surprising that the 
continent has not played a bigger role in PMSC regulation. 
The main argument in this article is that PMSC policy stasis at the AU is a 
question of regional agency, which is the sum of regional and inter-regional 
factors. The fact that the AU has not explicitly repealed the OAU Mercenary 
Convention of 1977 is a result of ‘agency slack’, whereby the AU takes 
independent action to produce undesirable or unexpected outcomes (defined 
below). It does this through shirking, which is a form of agency slack wherein an 
actor minimizes the effort it is capable of exerting. The shirking comes as a result 
of two sets of intertwined factors that are found at regional and international levels. 
Regionally, the shirking is the sum of historical developments, which gridlocked 
the OAU and AU into an old cognitive framework that treats PMSCs as 
mercenaries. This cognitive framework influenced the work of the AU 
Commission. Furthermore, PMSC-producing African states have not adequately 
interceded between national and continental policy processes that could effectively 
replace the 1977 convention. Internationally, Africa’s quest to protect its agency 
oscillates between non-binding processes in Europe and an ailing UN policy 
formulation overshadowed by the former. Contrary to popular opinion, African 
states were not actively involved in the drafting of the Montreux Document and the 
resultant International Code of Conduct of Private Security Service Providers. The 
AU is also reluctant to be associated with the Montreux Document. The reluctance 
of the AU to be associated with this non-legal process is further influenced by 
dynamics of PMSC operations in mission spaces. The AU and its member states 
are unable to monitor PMSCs or hold them to account due to the power asymmetry 
in the partnership.  
Private security, Africa and global security: A literature review  
The literature on critical theory provides a useful account of international 
cooperation. In the section that follows the main assumptions of the theory and its 
central concepts are explored. This is done by considering the taxonomy of PMSC, 
the idea of limited statehood in the African context, and finally the attempts at 
international regulation of PMSCs. 
Critical theory and African agency in international cooperation 
As a study premised on critical security theory, it is important to highlight a 
few useful concepts and assumptions. African agency is an increasingly important 
element of critical security studies. One of the main assumptions within critical 
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security theory is that many mainstream studies fail to transcend a ‘Eurocentric’ 
view.8 As Mbembe points out, Africa is still treated as “absolute otherness”, which 
is used to draw attention to a lack of European self-reflection in most studies.9 
Africa’s marginalisation in international relations goes as far back as 
Morgenthau.10 At its worst, anything African with a pre-colonial identity has been 
yawned away as irrelevant.11 However, the changes in Africa since the early 2000s 
have increased the number of studies on Africa as a significant actor in 
international cooperation, although Africa is still treated as sitting on the periphery 
of a Western order.12 This enduring treatment of Africa invites a discussion that 
places an emphasis on African agency in global politics, especially given that the 
use of PMSCs is slightly contested between the AU and its partners.  
African agency has become a source of interest to a number of scholars 
who seek to highlight the contribution of the continent in international processes. 
Agency, as a concept, can be assessed by exploring its nature and dimensions. 
Wight, as cited in Brown, argues that agency “is a freedom of subjectivity in 
action, involving both meaning and intentionality”.13 Brown argues that agency has 
three dimensions, namely doing something, positionality in a simultaneously 
enabling and constraining context, and formal or informal roles, which may also 
enable or constrain their choices.14 This resonates with what Hawkins et al. call 
“agency slack” where agency slack refers to an independent action that is 
undesirable to contracting parties. 15 According to Hawkins et al., this takes two 
forms: shirking, which refers to an agent minimising the effort it exerts, or 
slippage, which refers to an agent who shifts policy away from a preferred 
outcome to its own preferences. These concepts were useful for the present study, 
and were used to examine the actions of the AU. AU actions should thus be 
understood as being exercised on behalf of member states under a principal agent 
model.  
PMSC definitions, taxonomy and perceptions 
There is a scholarly debate on whether or not PMSCs are ‘mercenaries’ in 
new clothing. The acronym PMSC is a merger of ‘private military companies’ 
(PMCs) and what is referred to as ‘private security companies’ (PSCs). Notionally, 
the former have a military nature, while the latter have a policing function. 
However, the terms are difficult to distinguish as PMSCs often provide more than 
one type of service.16 The changeable nature of PMSCs inadvertently plays into 
definitional and conceptual ambiguities. It is for this reason that the UN Working 
Group on Mercenaries also tends to use the two terms interchangeably.17 In the 
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study reported here, the author therefore chose to remain neutral on definitions so 
that the actual perceptions of policymakers may be self-evident. 
Perceptions of PMSCs as a corporate incarnation of mercenaries are 
entrenched in the African continent. For instance, even though the OAU did not 
take much action, Burkinabe mercenaries operated in conflicts in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone for years before the advent of military companies.18 To compound the 
matter, these mercenaries later worked alongside Sandline International (a British 
PMSC) conducting the same type of operations.19 This collaboration between 
African mercenaries and Western PMSCs further reinforced perceptions of PMSCs 
as mercenaries in corporate clothing. The modus operandi of Africa’s classic PMC, 
Executive Outcomes, resembled that of mercenaries.20 The difference between the 
old mercenaries and this new corporate entity is that the latter comprised a fully 
registered commercial enterprise with a host state, consisted of typical corporate 
structures, and became part of the global market of conflict.21 This did not help 
perceptions in Africa because there was a similarity of objectives between the two 
entities. This had deep implications for the revision of the existing convention on 
mercenary activities.  
The continental convention on this phenomenon is yet to be revised. The 
referent convention is the OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in 
Africa of 1977 (hereafter OAU Convention on Mercenarism). One scholar posited, 
“this international legislation is hopelessly outdated”.22 It would seem that some 
observers would have preferred a newer convention under the AU. However, to 
dismiss this as ‘hopelessly outdated’ is far-fetched. The OAU Convention on 
Mercenarism contains most of the international obligations in the purportedly 
newer Montreux Document, which reminds practitioners of obligations under 
international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL).23 
Furthermore, the literature on international institutions evinces the fact that 
international regimes and institutions do not exist in a vacuum but are a result of 
systematic efforts to show complementarity between institutional transitions.24 
Similarly, some laws can be applicable across different political or institutional 
dispensations. That is why there are ad hoc structures at the AU Commission to 
manage the revision of conventions promulgated under the OAU. Furthermore, 
there are multiple initiatives, however political and imperfect, to find a 
compromise between a strong norm and international convention on this issue.25 
Instead of impugning old conventions, this study explains why this convention is 
yet to be revised.  
PMSCs and limited statehood in Africa 
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The role of PMSCs in African security should also be seen as a function of 
limited statehood in Africa. This article ties PMSC activity to the concept of 
limited statehood because “most states are neither consolidated nor failed”.26 The 
role of PMSCs tends to fill the vacuum in the ability of some African states to 
provide security to its citizens. In the cases of Angola and Sierra Leone, the armies 
under legitimate governments did not have complete control over their territory. 
PMSCs provided a supporting role to the efforts to eliminate armed conflicts and 
create stability.  
The involvement of PMSCs in African security can be understood from 
different perspectives. From one perspective, PMSCs are considered useful actors 
in the quest for peace and stability on the African continent. Some scholars argue 
that PMSCs break cycles of violence in conflicts.27 Such cycles of violence are 
common in conflict hotspots such as in the Great Lakes Region (GLR).28 These 
states often have weak or underequipped armies that cannot provide security to 
their entire territories. It was in this vein, that Executive Outcomes supported 
Sierra Leonean and Angolan governments by providing advanced expertise that 
these governments did not possess.29 From another perspective, PMSCs often 
improve the low capacity of African militaries. Howe argues that most of the 
military forces of Africa are weak and vulnerable.30 This partially explains why ill-
equipped non-state armed actors can hold off government forces.31 For that reason, 
Shearer posits that PMSCs could help improve the capacity of African armies.32 
These PMSCs are highly trained, and have competence in the areas of combat, 
intelligence and reconnaissance, which is transferrable to such armies.33 However, 
these inputs into debates concerning African security should be prefaced with a 
caveat, this is because they do not take into account the fact that, for the most part, 
many governments in Africa did not want to deal directly with PMSCs but often 
preferred military assistance from countries such as the United States, Britain, 
France, Russia, Israel and China.  
PMSCs also have a number of controversies that derive from their 
historical legacy in the Global South. The main concern revolves around the 
corporatisation of security services. As Leander points out, it is difficult to 
guarantee that PMSCs can always adhere to contracts signed with respective 
governments.34 The underlying argument here is that PMSCs are market-driven 
service providers, which may switch sides in a conflict across time. In a bizarre 
case, the British government was alleged to have worked closely with Sandline 
International (alongside Nigerian troops) to overthrow President Kabbah’s 
regime.35 PMSCs operatives from Sandline International acted as Kabbah’s 
strategic advisors while simultaneously supplying rebel groups.36 Suffice it to say, 
contrary to Shearer’s argument, PMSCs may actually recycle conflict. Another 
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controversy surrounds the possibility of PMSCs ballooning to larger proportions 
within a more robust, growing market for force.37 Although the UN is of the view 
that conflicts have declined by 46% since the end of the Cold War,38 this may not 
be the case. To the contrary, many of the emerging PMSCs take a less virulent (or 
militaristic) form.39 However, that should be taken with a pinch of salt, given that 
most of the personnel in such non-combat PMSCs come from a combat 
background.  
International regulation of PMSCs 
The scholarship on the regulation of PMSCs largely matches the progress 
made at policy level. This is because these scholars have themselves been involved 
in the formulation of regulatory policy. Percy argues that states have failed to 
create an international anti-mercenary law because there was a strong anti-
mercenary norm that was superseded by events.40 This only explains the limitations 
in the UN system, which has hitherto not completed the formulation of a binding 
international instrument. The other major effort towards an international regulatory 
framework is the Montreux processes, which resulted in the Montreux Document 
and the International Code of Conduct for Security Service Providers (ICoC). 
Cockayne posits that this regulatory framework has promises and weaknesses in its 
detailed outline of the obligations of existing state and non-state parties under 
international law.41 These two regulatory frameworks differ in that the first is a 
state-centric process that portends to have a legally binding status, while the latter 
is a Swiss-sponsored initiative that leans towards self-regulation, and which hopes 
to gain political buy-in from more states.  
Why does the Swiss government initiative matter? Processes and initiatives 
such as this one form the daily business of lobbying in Geneva. Following on the 
logic of Keck and Sikkink on transnational advocacy networks, if the Montreux 
Document and the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA) gain 
widespread political support, it could result in a strong international norm, which 
would likely influence a resultant international convention at the UN General 
Assembly.42 Even if this takes decades, it has the potential to form what is known 
as ‘interstitial law’, wherein legal obligations are inferred from existing customary 
practices and indirectly applicable laws.43 As it stands, the Montreux Document 
provides such a threshold. From another perspective, it would seem as if the 
African continent could invoke the principle of a ‘persistent objector’ should the 
Montreux Document and ICoCA eventually influence a UN international 
convention.44 However, two things threaten to undermine African agency in such a 
context. First, although African states may be in a position to withdraw from such a 
law as international customary law permits,45 the UN membership of all AU 
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member states would undermine the ability of the latter for agency slack due to 
limited buy-in. Second, international customary practice is not set on the viability 
to withdraw, as it now seems to suggest that such a law would still be binding on a 
persistent objector.46 In cases such as this one, whether or not the AU would agree 
with the application of such an international convention would be left to the 
devices of political coercion, which already define Africa’s international 
interactions.47 Thus, the way in which the AU approaches the Montreux initiative 
has significant implications for the future of PMSC regulation.  
Regional and international dynamics of private security in Africa: Policy and 
realities  
The historical legacy left by mercenaries influences policymaking in 
several ways. As highlighted in the preceding section, mercenaries have an ugly 
legacy in Africa. They may be perceived as a destabilising political factor, as they 
have attempted to dislodge legitimate or elected governments in several African 
states.48 In most cases, such mercenaries have been from other countries.49 Their 
transnational operations threaten regional stability wherein the security of several 
states is intertwined. The idea of mercenaries operating across porous borders and 
confronting national armies in states with limited statehood is certainly a source of 
concern. Part of the concern was that external powers tended to use mercenaries to 
undermine state building in Africa. The use of Belgian mercenaries in Katanga in 
the 1960s as well as Portuguese mercenaries in Guinea in the 1970s also played 
into the fears of governments and policymakers across Africa. These experiences 
have had a profound cognitive impression on the processes of policymaking at 
different levels of government.  
Perceptions of PMSCs as mercenaries still linger in policymaking circles 
including those at the AU Commission. This argument is based on the similarities 
in functions and objectives between PMSCs and mercenaries. An official AU 
statement highlights these concerns by stating, “of late some groups have decided 
to move their mercenary activities and hide them under private security 
activities”.50 This shows that the AU considers PMSCs to be mercenaries operating 
under a corporate cloak. The fact that such a policy position was taken seven years 
since the Iraqi and Afghan wars and three years since NATO’s use of PMSCs in its 
support to the AU Mission in Darfur, is telling. This suggests that policymakers are 
fully aware of the realities of the mission space.  
The promulgation of such a position is a form of shirking. Here the AU is 
deliberately minimising its effort in promulgating a policy despite its experiences. 
AU member states, such as South Africa and Angola, are among PMSC-producing 
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states. Furthermore, the AU’s main partners, such as NATO and the US 
AFRICOM, occasionally contract PMSCs for some of their support operations in 
Sudan and Darfur.51 Moreover, the UN also contracts some PMSCs for protection 
services in places such as Somalia (discussed later).52 The reinstatement of this 
policy at an important meeting in 2015 signifies the seriousness of the AU’s 
position on the nature of PMSCs.  
The policy processes and mechanisms at the AU Commission portend an 
unlikely speedy revision of the OAU Convention on Mercenarism. The structural 
configuration and synergy of the union suggests that this may take long. The 
revision of this convention would involve a chain of organs and departments that 
have a footloose relationship. First, the primary onus to expedite the revision rests 
with the AU Commission on International Law (hereafter AUCIL). The AUCIL is 
charged with revising all OAU conventions to make them applicable under the 
AU.53 However, the AUCIL does not have a strong relationship with the Peace and 
Security Directorate (PSD), which works closely with the AU’s international 
security partners. Moreover, there is little interaction between the (AU) Office of 
the Legal Council and the Peace and Security Department.54 The fact that the PSD 
considers PMSCs as mercenaries suggests that this convention may not be a top 
priority among several others.  
The aforementioned position of the PSD on PMSCs signifies agency slack 
in the form of slippage. This means that the AU will use its structural weaknesses 
as a way of shifting attention away from this policy. In any case, the current 
reliance on international donor support puts the AU in a vulnerable position. 
Conversely, a delay in policy promulgation works in its favour. Whatever policy 
recommendations can be issued by the AUCIL will need to pass through the 
Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC). Important states, such as Algeria 
and Egypt, have already stated that they will not participate in processes that 
involve PMSCs, including humanitarian processes.55 Such a position is likely to 
gain support as a result of the experiences of other key member states (discussed 
below). This recalcitrance of member states suggests that the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government (AHSG) – which is the ultimate source of power in the 
Commission – is unlikely to vote in favour of the revision of this law in such a way 
that such revision will differ vastly from the current optic in which PMSCs are 
mercenaries reincarnated. This reluctance of several states informs the shared 
preference for a more binding regulatory law under the auspices of the UN 
(discussed in the next section).  
African states mutually lobby for a collective international instrument, 
which is legally binding on the private security industry. The promulgation of a 
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UN convention would then provide a precedent for the AU and member states to 
formulate laws that could effectively regulate the private security industry. For 
instance, South Africa’s Foreign Assistance Act of 1998 was influenced by the UN 
International Convention on the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries of 1989.56 The Africa Group at the UN in New York vehemently 
lobbied for the UN Convention on Mercenaries, which came into force in 2001. 
Similarly, the Africa Group strongly lobbied for a new convention to regulate 
PMSCs.57 Some observers worry that most AU member states have not commented 
on the existing draft of the UN convention.58 However, the UN approach is a two-
track process and slightly overshadowed by the Swiss initiative (discussed below). 
AU member states lean towards a UN convention because such convention would 
carry more weight as it will have uniform legitimacy and legality across the world.  
The preference of the African region for an international convention with a 
universally binding legal status derives from the outcomes of regulatory 
experiments at the national level. Although South Africa, Angola and Uganda are 
key PMSC-producing or PMSC-hosting states, the case of South Africa makes for 
interesting discussion. Sections 4 and 7 of South Africa’s Private Security Industry 
Regulation Act No. 56 of 2001 require the clearance of all ex-employees of the 
entire security sector prior to employment in a PMSC and close monitoring of the 
change of name and trade of PMSCs, respectively.59 As a result of this law, some 
of the PMSCs ceased trading in South Africa and opened under different names in 
the Seychelles and the Middle East. The ability of companies to take advantage of 
transnational legal loopholes encourages regulation across the region. The 
foregoing case suggests that an AU convention may not be enough. A convention 
that transcends regions would help to prevent this opportunistic behaviour by 
PMSCs. the absence of such a law across regions undermines some national efforts 
in a different way. 
The heterogeneity of approaches to PMSC regulation across African tips 
external pressure against national regulatory efforts. South Africa’s seminal 
legislation, the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1998, was made 
to prevent (or limit) the spread of PMSC activities into the rest of the continent.60 
However, this was still not signed into law by the end of Thabo Mbeki’s 
presidency. When President Jacob Zuma sought to sign it into law in 2007, the 
United Kingdom was against it and threatened to grant citizenship to all South 
Africans serving in the British army.61 Without such a law in a member state with 
the largest number of PMSCs, the African continent has no experiential precedent. 
This lack of a clear precedent leaves the continent, especially the AUCIL, at the 
mercy of others’ experiences, which might not be consistent with African realities. 
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This could cause policy hiccups at an operational level as it could undermine 
Africa’s agency within security partnerships.  
Inter-regional and global dynamics: Agency, asymmetry and preferences  
At an international level, African states are channelling efforts towards a 
binding international law on PMSCs. Historically, the Africa Group at the United 
Nations played a lead role in the adoption of the UN international convention on 
mercenaries. When the question of PMSCs arose in the early 2000s, the group 
sought to have the same influence in a draft form that was initially sponsored by 
Russia and some Asian states. However, the United States, United Kingdom and 
EU states rejected this idea, mainly arguing that PMSCs are distinct from 
mercenaries.62 As a corollary, two processes ensued in the context of the UN: draft 
legislation and a special rapporteur on the same issue. In 2005, Resolution 2005/2 
of the Commission on Human Rights ended the mandate of the UN Special 
Rapporteur and replaced it with the UN Working Group on Mercenaries.63 Five 
years later, Resolution 15/26 of the UN Human Rights Council created a more 
open-ended intergovernmental working group on PMSCs.64 However, through the 
UN, these initiatives have done little to improve the role of African member states.  
The agential role of African member states in this regard becomes difficult. 
First, although this seems inclusive with sixty participating states, the possibility of 
influencing a stronger norm in Geneva appears difficult. For instance, South Africa 
– as a leading African state in this area – does not appear to be in a position to be a 
strong norm entrepreneur. In several instances, it has given vague statements that 
do not convey a strong national or regional position.65 Second, as of 2010, most 
African governments have not commented on the Working Group’s draft 
convention.66 Part of the reason is that the AHSG and the Executive Council of 
Ministers (at the AU) are yet to work on this issue and produce a common position. 
Such a position would provide a uniform response to the UN draft international 
convention. Third, shirking or slippage is difficult because the UN Working Group 
on Mercenaries is labouring in the backyard of a more powerful self-regulatory 
initiative sponsored by the Swiss government.  
The role of African states in the Montreux Document should not be 
overstated. No African state is an official party to the Montreux Document. The 
Montreux Document and the ICoCA are part of a self-regulatory initiative 
sponsored by the Swiss government. This initiative co-sponsored by the Red Cross, 
reminds non-state armed actors of their obligations under international law.67 The 
information provided by the Swiss foreign ministry and Singer’s article suggests 
that Angola, Sierra Leone and South Africa have been participants in the Montreux 
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process since 2008, while Uganda and Madagascar acceded to the initiative in 
2009.68 However, according to the South African ‘representative’, none of the 
African participants were official representatives of their member states.69 For 
instance, the person in question was then based at the Institute for Security Studies 
(ISS) and was in one case asked to lobby for buy-in from the Department of 
International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), which the latter rejected. This 
overstatement of the South African role portends a manipulation of political buy-in 
for a process that is likely to overshadow the UN process, and thus undermine 
African agency in this international process.  
The AU’s response to the Montreux Document is clearly vindictive. It 
should be realised that the Montreux Document is not meant to be a binding legal 
instrument, but it attempts to create a strong international norm that is likely to 
produce an international regime. Geneva is an ideal place for norm 
entrepreneurship and lobbying.70 In the same vein, the Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Armed Forces (DCAF), which housed the Montreux Document, has 
been lobbying for political buy-in from various states. The DCAF has lobbied the 
AU twice: in 2010, alongside South Africa, and again in 2015.71 (South Africa 
responded by producing a shadow document on PMSCs72). The AU’s response in 
2015 was exactly the same as in 2010. The Common African Defence and Security 
Policy (CADSP) expert gave the same speech, which purported that PMSCs are a 
corporate incarnation of mercenaries. The statement also suggested that it was for 
the AU to deal with the issue using its internal structures and processes.73 This 
suggests that the AU is ambivalent towards a non-binding initiative that is 
sponsored by states which rejected the initial draft convention at the UN. Such an 
initiative would not address current PMSC dynamics in the African peace support 
missions. 
The agency slack exhibited by the AU draws from the dynamics of 
partnership collaboration in the mission space. These issues relate to regulation and 
accountability. The AU’s key international partners in Sudan and Somalia are 
NATO and US AFRICOM. These two subcontract some of their activities to 
PMSCs. For the most part, NATO subcontracted American and East European 
PMSCs for logistics and airlift in Darfur, while the United States used different 
kinds of PMSCs in the Somalian mission space.74 Accountability has become a hot 
issue because PMSCs are accountable only as far as they are contractually 
obligated. In this case, it is challenging when an organisation does not have a 
transformational partnership with the AU.75 The difficulty is that the host states can 
do little when the contracting parties are the AU and its partners.  
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PMSCs also compound the issue of accountability through a tendency to 
shift purposes from military to policing activities within a single mission. The case 
of DynCorp International in Liberia is illustrative. DynCorp was contracted by the 
US government for a demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) 
programme in Liberia, as part of its contribution to the latter’s post-conflict 
reconstruction and development.76 Soon after, DynCorp shifted its mission from 
DDR to logistics as well as a contract to build airports and to train Nigerian troops 
deployed in Liberia.77 This fluidity of PMSCs, which enables them to shift between 
militaristic and policing (or even non-security activities) complicates issues 
relating to accountability. In this case, these shifts are linked to the various 
different projects sponsored by the United States. African actors, including Nigeria, 
which is one of the main norm entrepreneurs on the continent, are not in a position 
to raise issues of accountability because they are benefactors of US aid and military 
assistance (which is contracted to American PMSCs). Regulation thus becomes 
difficult where the African parties are not funding the processes and mechanisms 
that add up to an international convention.  
Finally, the political economy of PMSCs in African peace support 
operations is increasingly compromising African states that play a critical role in 
African security. The majority of African troop-contributing countries in Somalia 
and Darfur are all sponsored by the West.78 These include Rwanda, Burundi, 
Botswana and Uganda. The political economy of private security takes two forms. 
In the first instance, found in Somalia and Sudan, the AU’s partners directly 
contract Western or East European private security firms leaving out African 
private security firms.79 The second and more recent development concerns the 
agency of Africa’s key states in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). 
Following an attack on the UN compound in Mogadishu, the UN Secretary General 
announced the creation of a UN Guard Unit made up of three battalions from the 
Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF).80 This UN Guard Unit is constitutively 
and operationally a quasi-PMSC. Senior officers from the UPDF have retired to 
manage this guard unit.81 This development sets a precedent for a market for force 
which is likely to undermine future deliberation of a regional policy among African 
states.  
Conclusion 
This article has argued that the African regional policy stasis on the 
regulation of private military and security companies is primarily a function of 
African agency in norm and agenda setting. This policy position steadfastly 
portrays PMSCs as a corporate incarnation of mercenaries. The historical precedent 
81 
 
of mercenary activity in Africa has entrenched such perceptions among 
policymakers. Key among these precedents is the inference by external actors 
using mercenaries. To that end, the African continent is adamant on a legally 
binding international convention through the UN. However, such a process is slow, 
fluid and subject to high politics. It risks being overshadowed by two European 
initiatives, namely the Montreux Document and ICoCA. The AU and key AU 
member states resisted being formally associated with these initiatives. The 
experiences of key member states within their countries also contributed to the 
current policy position. The interference of external powers, who are also PMSC-
sending states, has also affected the position of Africa as a collective. Overall, the 
AU and member states have used two forms of agency slack, shirking and slippage, 
to assert its agency on this issue. They primarily minimized efforts to repeal the 
OAU Convention on Mercenarism (of 1977) without a strong UN international 
convention which would have stronger legal status. The AU has also consciously 
played the AU Commission’s structural weaknesses in its favour in order to escape 
a Western-driven initiative that could undermine its regional preferences. However, 
the (limited) individual responses of AU member states to the UN draft convention 
have been weak or sluggish. Thus, this policy stasis is not an act of institutional 
ineptitude but one of protecting agency and continental preferences in international 
affairs.  
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